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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CECIL D. DANIELS, ) 
) S.Ct. No. 40811-2013 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) D.Ct. No. 2011-7510 
) (Kootenai County) 
vs. ) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OF PETITION FOR 
) REVIEW 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW Appellant Cecil Daniels, through counsel of record Deborah Whipple, 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 118, and offers this brief in support of his Petition for Review. 
Review should be granted in the interests of justice because the Court of Appeals' 
decision in this case denies those prosecuted by the State of Idaho their state and federal 
constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and access to the courts. Idaho Const. Art. I, §§ 13 
and 18, United States Const. Amends. 5, 6, and 14. 
History of the Case 
Mr. Daniels was charged by information with felony DUI; possession of a controlled 
substance; driving without privileges; and providing false information to law enforcement 
following a traffic stop in 2008. R 29. He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during 
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the traffic stop. R 29-30. However, the motion was denied. R 30. Mr. Daniels filed a motion to 
reconsider. R 30-31. That motion was also denied. R 31. 
At trial Mr. Daniels was convicted of felony DUI, possession of an open container of 
alcohol, driving without privileges, and providing false information to law enforcement. The 
jury could not reach a verdict on possession of a controlled substance. R 31. 
The court sentenced Mr. Daniels to ten years with a minimum fixed term of three years 
on the DUI. R 31. 
Mr. Daniels filed a timely notice of appeal. R 31. In his notice of appeal, he specifically 
noted that an issue to be presented on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying the 
motion to suppress. R37054, Vol. 8, p. 27.1 
However, on appeal, appointed counsel raised only the issues that the district court 
imposed an excessive sentence and later erred in denying Mr. Daniels' Criminal Rule 35 motion 
for reduction of the sentence. R 28-39. The Court of Appeals denied appellate relief in an 
unpublished decision that was less than two pages long. R 44-45. 
Mr. Daniels filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. R 5-11. The court 
appointed counsel and an amended petition was filed. R 27,46-49. The amended petition 
alleged: 
2. Petitioner contends that appellate counsel failed to adequately prosecute his 
appeal in as much as appellate counsel refused, despite Petitioner's specific 
requests, to argue that the trial court erred by denying Petitioner's motion to 
suppress, and violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and right to 
due process of law, and but for this deficiency Petitioner would have argued that 
the denial of the motion to suppress was elTor, and would have prevailed on 
J This Court took judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal case in its order 
entered August 19,2013. 
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appeal, resulting in the reversal of his conviction. 
R47. 
In response to the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Daniels filed a 
memorandum which argued that, as appellate counsel had effectively abandoned the appeal, 
proof of prejudice was not required. R 60-64. The court denied the motion for summary 
dismissal as to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (A claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel was dismissed pursuant to Mr. Daniels' concession that there was no 
basis for it.) R 65-72. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Daniels presented evidence and argument to support his 
claim that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when appellate counsel did not raise 
the suppression issue on direct appeal. Tr. 1/28113. Mr. Daniels requested that the district court 
reinstate his right to appeal from all the convictions entered in the criminal case, most 
specifically the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. R 78. 
The district court denied Mr. Daniels' petition holding that Mr. Daniels had failed to 
establish that appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and further that he failed to establish that the outcome of the appeal would have 
been different if he had been able to present the suppression issue. R 77-89. 
This appeal timely followed. R 88-91. 
Decision in the Court of Appeals 
On March 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Mr. Daniels' petition for 
post-conviction relief in a published opinion. A copy of the Opinion is attached to this brief. 
Of import to this petition for review, Mr. Daniels argued on appeal that because Idaho has 
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no mechanism to allow an appellant to file apro se brief to address issues not raised by 
appointed counsel, the failure of his counsel to raise his suppression motion in his direct appeal 
was deficient performance which should be presumed prejudicial. Appellant's Opening Brief 
pages 3-7.2 The Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Daniels argues that Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 748 (1983), is distinguishable 
from the instant case because in Jones, in addition to appellant counsel's brief, the 
defendant was allowed to file a pro se brief raising claims that appellate counsel's 
brief omitted. Idaho has no appellate rule allowing a defendant to file a pro se 
brief in addition to appellate counsel's brief. Thus, Daniels claims that in Idaho, it 
should be a constitutional right to force counsel to raise all nonfrivolous issues on 
appeal. Although Daniels is correct that the appellant in Jones was able to file a 
pro se brief, we do not read the majority's opinion as requiring a mechanism to 
allow a pro se brief in addition to appellate counsel's brief, or alternatively, 
presume prejudice. 
Slip Op. page 5, fint. 1. 
Reason Why Review Should Be Granted 
Idaho, unlike some other states, has no mechanism to allow an appellant to file a pro se 
brief so long as he is represented by counsel. The denial of a procedure for filing a pro se brief 
combined with an inability to force appellate counsel to raise specific non-frivolous issues results 
in a denial of the state and federal constitutional rights to access to the courts, counsel, and due 
process. 
While Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983), does state that 
an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed appellate counsel 
to press all non-frivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue, that case involved an 
indigent appellant who was allowed to file his own pro se brief in addition to his appointed 
counsel's brief - by filing the pro se brief, the appellant had an opportunity to place his desired 
2 Appellant's Opening Brief is incorporated in full in this brief. 
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issues before the appellate court. It is that opportunity which is crucial to a constitutional 
analysis. 
As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Jones: 
Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806,95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975),] establishes that the 
right to counsel is more than a right to have one's case presented competently and 
effectively. It is predicated on the view that the function of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by 
assisting him in making choices that are his to make, not to make choices for him, 
although counsel may be better able to decide which tactics will be more effective 
for the defendant. Anders v. California[, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967),] 
also reflects that view. Even when appointed counsel believes an appeal has no 
merit, he must furnish his client a brief covering all arguable grounds for appeal 
so that the client may 'raise any points that he chooses.' 386 U.S., at 744,87 
S.Ct., at 1400. 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S., at 758, 108 S.Ct., at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
original). 
Idaho does not allow a pro se brief so long as the appellant is represented by counsel. 
Therefore, the constitutional safety valve present in Jones is missing here. While in Jones, it was 
not necessary to declare a constitutional right to force appointed counsel to raise any specific 
non-frivolous issue because the appellant could raise whatever issues he/she wished in a pro se 
brief, in Idaho, a constitutional right to force counsel to raise non-frivolous issues is necessary 
and will remain necessary so long as the appellate rules remain unchanged. Cf Washington 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.10 Statement of Additional Grounds for Review, which 
specifically authorizes an appellant in a review of a criminal case to file a pro se statement of 
additional grounds for review to identify and discuss those matters which the appellant believes 
have not been adequately addressed by the brief filed by counsel. See also, Oregon Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 5.92 Supplemental pro se briefs; Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 
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28(b), authorizing pro se supplemental briefs; Iowa Appellate Rule 6.901(2) Pro se supplemental 
proof briefs; Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.02, authorizing pro se supplemental 
briefs; Oklahoma Court Criminal Appellate Rule 3.4, setting out procedure for filing of pro se 
supplemental briefs. 
In accord with Jones, Mr. Daniels requests that this Petition for Review be granted and 
that this Court hold that until Idaho establishes procedures for the filing of pro se supplemental 
briefs in criminal appeals, appellants do in fact have state and federal constitutional rights to 
access to the courts, counsel, and due process which allow the appellants to compel counsel to 
raise all non-frivolous issues on appeal. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Daniels requests that this 
Court grant review and reverse the district court judgment denying him post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted thi§1g5 day of April, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on Aprill.. ~, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
to: 
~mailed 
hand delivered 
faxed 
Daphne J. Huang 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Deborah Whipple 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 40811 
CECIL G. DANIELS, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2014 Opinion No. 22 
Petitioner-Appellant, Filed: March 26,2014 
v. Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
------------------------------~) 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. Hon. Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge. 
Judgment denying petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett; Deborah Whipple, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
GRA TION, Judge 
Cecil G. Daniels appeals from the district court's judgment denying his petition for post-
conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A police officer stopped Daniels' vehicle after witnessing the vehicle twice swerve over 
the left line. The officer smelled the odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle, observed that 
Daniels' eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and observed that his speech was slurred. The officer 
performed a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, which Daniels failed. Daniels refused to perfonn 
any other field sobriety tests and the officer placed him under arrest. Thereafter, the passenger of 
the vehicle informed the officer that Daniels hid marijuana under the driver's seat. The officer 
searched the vehicle and discovered a film canister containing marijuana and a beer can. 
Daniels was charged with felony DUI, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005, possession of a 
controlled substance, I.e. § 37-2732(c)(3), driving without privileges, I.e. § 18-8001, providing 
false information to law enforcement officers, I.C. § 18-5413, and possession of an open 
container of alcohol in a public place, COEUR D'ALENE CODE § 5.08.l60A. Daniels filed a 
motion to suppress all seized evidence. The district court denied the motion. Daniels filed a 
motion to reconsider the denial of his suppression motion, which the district court also denied. 
Daniels was convicted upon a jury verdict of DUI, driving without privileges, providing 
false information to law enforcement, and possession of an open container of alcohol in a public 
place. He was acquitted of possession of a controlled substance. The district court imposed a 
unified term of ten years with three years determinate for the DUI conviction, and terms of one 
hundred and eighty days in jail for the remaining convictions. Daniels filed an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of the sentence, which the district court denied. Daniels appealed 
and this Court affirmed his judgment of conviction and sentence and the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion in State v. Daniels, Docket No. 37054 (Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished). 
Daniels filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court summarily dismissed Daniels' claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and held an evidentiary hearing regarding the claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court 
denied Daniels' petition for post-conviction relief. Daniels timely appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Daniels contends that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. In order to prevail in a post-conviction 
proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho 
Code § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. 
State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2010). When reviewing a decision 
denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the 
lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 14 I Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v. State, 
118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 
382; Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free 
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review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 
862,243 P.3d at 678. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcel/a v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. 
App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show 
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Seifv. State, 145 Idaho 578, 
580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden 
of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174,1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 
433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 
442, 163 P.3d at 231. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic 
decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based 
on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172,254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). The right to 
effective assistance of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a matter of right. Evitts 
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). 
The facts pertinent to Daniels' petition for post-conviction relief center on his motion to 
suppress evidence. Prior to trial, Daniels filed a motion to suppress arguing that the traffic stop 
was unduly prolonged by police questioning that did not pertain directly to the stop, and that the 
warrantless search of his vehicle was not within an established exception to the warrant 
requirement. The district court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the 
traffic stop and to ask Daniels questions in order to verify whether he was driving under the 
influence. Additionally, the court found that the officer's search of the vehicle was a valid 
search incident to a lawful arrest as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) ("[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile."), and adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653, 962 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1998) ("The 
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disarray in results noted by the United States Supreme Court and the need for a clear rule 
understood by both the public and the police are compelling reasons to adopt the rule enunciated 
in Belton . ... "). Accordingly, the district court denied Daniels' motion to suppress. Daniels 
filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the district court 
should apply the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332 (2009), which held that police may only search a vehicle incident to arrest when the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, 
or when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle. !d. at 343. The district court denied Daniels' motion to reconsider. Daniels did not 
appeal any issues regarding his motion to suppress. 
Daniels' petition for post-conviction relief asserted ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for failing to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing, wherein Daniels and his appellate counsel provided testimony. Daniels 
testified that he spoke with appellate counsel twice and requested that all the issues in his notice 
of appeal, including the issue of the denial of his motion to suppress, be raised in his appeal. He 
also testified that he did not know the suppression issue was not raised in his appeal until he was 
appointed counsel for his post-conviction proceedings. Appellate counsel testified that she sent 
Daniels two letters informing him of her contact information and encouraging him to contact her, 
but he did not contact her until after this Court issued its opinion. Additionally, appellate 
counsel testified that she did not challenge the suppression motion on appeal because she 
determined the challenge would not be successful as this Court's decision in State v. Cantrell, 
149 Idaho 247, 233 P.3d 178 (Ct. App. 2010) allows police officers to conduct a search incident 
to arrest to look for evidence ofDUI. Id. at 254, 233 P.3d at 185. 
A. Presumption of Prejudice 
Daniels first argues that appellate counsel's deficiency in failing to argue the suppression 
Issue on appeal amounted to a complete denial of appellate advocacy entitling him to a 
presumption of prejudice. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court 
held that there are narrow circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost 
of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Id. at 658; Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 
656, 660, 168 P.3d 40, 44 (Ct. App. 2007). The Cronic rule encompasses three situations where 
courts should presume that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency of counsel: (l) where 
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the presence of counsel is denied altogether at a critical stage; (2) where counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) where counsel is called 
upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60; Mintun, 144 Idaho at 660, 168 P.3d at 44. When a defendant seeks a 
presumption of prejudice based on appellate counsel's failure to test the prosecutor's case, 
counsel's failure must be complete. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-97 (2002); Mintun, 
144 Idaho at 660, 168 P.3d at 44. 
The Supreme Court has stated that appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to 
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by an appellant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983). Rather, appellate counsel is expected to use his or her professional training to examine 
the record and sort out weaker arguments in favor of central and key issues. !d. at 751-52. 
Indeed, raising every colorable issue in an appeal may bury the promising issues, resulting in a 
disservice to the goal of effective advocacy. Id. at 774. 
Here, Daniels asserts that he received the equivalent of no appellate advocacy because his 
appellate counsel focused his appeal on his sentence rather than his suppression motion, and 
Daniels argues the sentencing issue was the weaker of the appealable issues. He further argues 
that deficiency and a presumption of prejudice exist because Idaho has no mechanism to allow 
an appellant to file a pro se brief to address issues not raised by appellate counsel.l We disagree. 
Daniels was appointed counsel who reviewed his case, determined the issues to address 
on appeal, and filed a competent brief challenging Daniels' sentence. In Mintun, this Court was 
presented with similar facts and determined that because an adequate brief was filed, Mintun's 
situation was distinguishable from other cases that applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice. 
Mintun, 144 Idaho at 660-61, 168 P.3d at 44-45. Accordingly, this Court concluded that Mintun 
was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Id. at 661, 168 P.3d at 45. Following the 
Daniels argues that Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 748 (1983), is distinguishable from 
the instant case because in Jones, in addition to appellate counsel's brief, the defendant was 
allowed to file a pro se brief raising claims that appellate counsel's brief omitted. Idaho has no 
appellate rule allowing a defendant to file a pro se brief in addition to appellate counsel's brief. 
Thus, Daniels claims that in Idaho, it should be a constitutional right to force counsel to raise all 
nonfrivolous issues on appeal. Although Daniels is correct that the appellant in Jones was able 
to file a pro se brief, we do not read the majority's opinion as requiring a mechanism to allow a 
pro se brie f in addition to appellate counsel's brief or, alternatively, presume prejudice. 
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reasoning in A1intun, we conclude that in the instant case Daniels is not entitled, under Cronic, to 
a presumption of prejudice. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Daniels claims that appellate counsel's failure to raise the denial of his motion to 
suppress was deficient performance that was prejudicial. Specifically, Daniels asserts that 
appellate counsel's performance was deficient because a challenge to the motion to suppress 
would have been stronger than the challenge to his sentence. Additionally, Daniels argues 
appellate counsel's performance was prejudicial because had the suppression issue been 
presented, Daniels could have made a convincing argument that his DUI arrest was not sufficient 
to support a warrantless search. 
"Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on 
counsel's failure to raise a particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). To establish a deficiency, the 
petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 
442, 163 P.3d at 231. "[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will 
the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome." Mintun, 144 Idaho at 661, 
168 P .3d at 45 (citing Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288). 
Daniels failed to demonstrate that an appellate challenge to the denial of his motion to 
suppress was "clearly stronger" than the challenge to his sentence. Daniels asserts that the 
challenge to his sentence was "extremely weak" because the sentence was within the statutory 
limits and his past DUI record was extensive. Further, he argues that a suppression challenge 
would have been stronger because Idaho's jurisprudence on the issue, specifically the Cantrell 
decision's application of Gant, is inconsistent with some other state and federal cases 
interpreting Gant. 
Notwithstanding other jurisdiction's interpretations of Gant, Idaho has held that a DUI 
arrest supplies the basis for a search of a vehicle under Gant. In Cantrell, police officers arrested 
the defendant for DUI and secured him inside a patrol car. Police officers searched Cantrell's 
vehicle and discovered a beer can and marijuana. Cantrell challenged the denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence found in his vehicle on appeal. This Court determined that Cantrell's DUI 
arrest supplied the basis for police officers to search his vehicle for evidence of the DUI, and that 
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the search fit within the search incident to arrest exception articulated in Gant. Cantrell, 
149 Idaho at 254, 233 P.3d at 185. The instant case is substantially similar to the facts of 
Cantrell. Here, Daniels was arrested for DUI, his vehicle was searched incident to the arrest, and 
police officers found evidence of the DUI in the form of a beer can and a canister with 
marijuana.2 The search was appropriate under recent Idaho jurisprudence.3 Thus, an appeal 
challenging the district court's denial ofthe motion to suppress would have been unsuccessful. 
On the other hand, appellate counsel routinely files excessive sentence challenges and, 
while it may be that the standard of review makes it difficult to succeed on such a challenge, 
Idaho appellate courts have, on several occasions, granted sentencing relief. Although Daniels 
argues in his brief that the challenge to his sentence was "extremely weak" due to his past 
criminal record, Daniels has failed to articulate to this Court how the specific arguments made by 
his appellate counsel in his appeal were "weak." Accordingly, we cannot say that a challenge to 
Daniels' motion to suppress would have been "clearly stronger" than the challenge to his 
sentence. Moreover, we will not second-guess appellate counsel's strategic decision to pursue 
Daniels' excessive sentence challenge rather than to pursue an unsuccessful challenge to the 
suppression motion. 
Finally, Daniels is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his appellate 
counsel's failure to challenge his suppression motion. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 
show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 
144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231. As discussed above, the search of Daniels' vehicle was a 
valid search incident to arrest under Cantrell. An appeal of the motion to suppress would not 
have changed the outcome. Additionally, Daniels has failed to identify what evidence he was 
seeking to suppress and has not articulated how the failure to suppress that evidence was 
prejudicial to the outcome of his proceedings. Thus, Daniels is unable to establish prejudice. 
2 Additionally, the passenger of the vehicle informed the officer that Daniels hid marijuana 
under the driver's seat prior to the officer's search of the vehicle. 
We note that Cantrell was issued in March 20 I 0 and our opinion on Daniels' underlying 
appeal was issued in October 20 I o. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
Daniels has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Accordingly, the district court's 
judgment denying Daniels' petition for post-conviction relief is affinned. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
8 
